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. Robinson [Appearing below is the first of three articles in a series titled "Transition in El Salvador."
The second will be released in the 08/23/91 issue, and the third in the 08/28/91 issue of the CAU.]
After 10 years of civil war and an effective military stalemate, El Salvador is inching ever further
towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict, once referred to by the Reagan administration as
"the decisive battle for Central America." Sources close to the peace negotiations which in May
entered a stage of total secrecy by mutual agreement to avoid external political pressures that could
hamper progress , say the government of President Alfredo Cristiani and the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) could sign a cease-fire agreement before the end of this year.
Such an agreement, although only the first step in what remains an arduous and uncertain road
toward a definitive settlement, would constitute the key breakthrough since the negotiations began
in April 1990 in Geneva under United Nations mediation. Prospects for a truce in effect by yearend are attributed to the initiative taken by FMLN following the legislative and municipal elections
held last March. The guerrillas agreed for the first time to simultaneously discuss a cease-fire and
to negotiate the issues of "demilitarization" and constitutional reform. Previously, they had insisted
that agreement over the latter two issues must occur before implementation of any armistice.
The FMLN initiative led to a three-week meeting in Mexico last April. Delegates from both sides
convened in three "dialogue commissions" to discuss major agenda items. Agreements from those
meetings focused on enacting constitutional reforms before the new Legislative Assembly, elected
in the March 10 voting, took office on May 1. Under the Salvadoran constitution, reforms must be
approved by two consecutive legislatures. Thus, if the outgoing Assembly had not approved the
reforms that were proposed in Mexico before it left office, then all constitutional changes approved
by the incoming Assembly would have had to await ratification by the next legislature, which will
be elected in 1994. In effect, this would have stalled the peace negotiations for three years, since
the guerrillas have stated they will not sign a final peace accord without constitutional reforms
in place. Under intense international pressure, the two sides reached agreement April 27 on the
reforms. The reforms were approved by the outgoing Legislative Assembly in San Salvador after
a three-day session, literally on the eve of May 1 deadline. The constitutional changes include
reforms in the security forces and in the statutes assuring civilian authority over them, the judicial
system, and the electoral code. With the breakthrough in Mexico, negotiations have turned in the
subsequent meetings (May 24-June 2 in Venezuela, June 16-22 in Mexico, and July 9-12, again in
Mexico) to the terms of a cease-fire and demilitarization. These meetings have been held in total
secrecy, but spokespersons from both sides say progress has been made, notwithstanding heated
exchanges at the bargaining table. One point of contention is over the demarcation of armistice
territories where the FMLN would concentrate its forces once a cease-fire goes into effect , the
location of "neutral zones," and where the government's troops would be stationed. Another is
the FMLN's proposal for "armed peace," whereby rebel combatants would remain armed during
the truce while negotiations continue on other agenda items and during a period of nation-wide
organizing by FMLN political leaders. The government has rejected this proposal, insisting that
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the rebels must first disarm before carrying out legal political activities. Demilitarization - crux of
a settlement Demilitarization is the thorniest issue, and the one which more pessimistic observers
fear might prove insurmountable under current conditions. FMLN demands currently under
discussion include reforms of the Armed Forces, substantial troop strength reduction, dissolution
of special battalions, and the dismantlement of paramilitary structures. Inside sources say that
while the items are delicate, they are resolvable. But the guerrillas' insistence on an end to military
impunity, including the investigation of officers' conduct during the war, purging corrupt officials
and initiating judicial procedures against those found responsible for human rights violations,
has touched a raw nerve in the military. Under discussion are the formation of two commissions
(an "Ac Hoc Committee" and a "Truth Commission") which would address the issue of past
human rights violations and procedures to be taken against those responsible. The army high
command and officers corps want to avoid, at all costs, mass prosecutions and Argentine-style
public trials. Military delegates in the negotiations argue that investigations be handled through the
regular courts rather than through special tribunals or judicial procedures. Discharges rather than
criminal prosecution, they say, should be the standard sanction for those found guilty. Behind the
intransigence of the military is its frank recognition that an unrestricted investigation and purges
would effectively undercut military impunity, and constitute the most crucial step in the process
of eliminating military prerogative in state and society. In the last analysis, military dominance
or prerogatives constitute the singular overriding issue in ending the war. According to a recent
publication of the Jesuit-run Central America University in San Salvador, "The Mexico Accords
are of great importance...However, it has not been constitutional reforms but the theme of the
Armed Forces that has held back the negotiations since the Geneva Accord was signed. This is
the determinant issue in ending the war...[T]he extreme right has made clear that its real fears
do not lie in constitutional issues but in defense of its impunity. "[The constitutional reforms] are
aimed at subordinating the Armed Forces to civilian power through the creation of a civilian police
force and an intelligence organ independent of the army and under the authority of the President
of the Republic. But this is not all that must be modified in order to reduce military interference
in civil society, given that the issue of purges and an end to impunity have been postponed, as
well as those of the demilitarization of society and the future of two armies one regular and the
other irregular." Yet, when placed in perspective, the current points of contention represent
in themselves tremendous progress over the original negotiating positions spelled out by both
sides when the process began in April 1990. At the time, the FMLN called for nothing less than
the disappearance of the Salvadoran Armed Forces as an institution. The ARENA government
insisted it was "dialoguing, not negotiating," and called for the disarmament and integration of
insurgents into civilian society before any legal or political changes could be discussed. The army
argued for the virtual preservation of its institutional prerogative, along with a sort of "Ley de
Punto Final," or a blanket pardon for the military. The rough road of setbacks and advances The
national, regional and international conditions for a real negotiated settlement to the Salvadoran
conflict have come into place in the past three years. (See "El Salvador: The Art of Negotiations
and Prospects for a Settlement," CAU, 09/14/90.) The change in the FMLN's bargaining position
(agreement to simultaneously negotiate a cease-fire and other agenda items) means a cease-fire,
or "armed peace" as the insurgents call it, could go into effect before an overall settlement of the
war is reached. Signing a cease-fire under such conditions would place tremendous pressure on
all sides to carry through on the other agenda items in the negotiations process, and raise the
political costs for either side of resuming the option of war. Nevertheless, the momentum towards a
successful settlement is not inexorable, and the obstacles are formidable. Even if the demilitarization
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issue is resolved, there are still four pending agenda items for negotiation: economic reforms,
judicial reforms, human rights, and United Nations monitoring of a settlement. These points "the
Caracas Agenda" were originally approved by both sides at a meeting in Caracas, following the
historic Geneva session, as the program for negotiations. But last March, the FMLN proposed
accelerating the peace process by temporarily simplifying the agenda to constitutional reforms,
demilitarization and a cease-fire. Resumption of disucssion on the remaining four points is bound to
run up against strong disagreements and new stumbling blocks. Despite the clamor from virtually
all sectors of society for an end to the war, entrenched factions in the military and extreme rightist
groups from the traditional oligarchy still have more to lose than gain from a negotiated peace.
Although these sectors are ever more isolated and under great pressure (including from the US)
to bend, they still have the capacity to undermine the bid for peace. The FMLN is determined
to participate as a legal, civic force in the March 1994 presidential elections. Sources close to
the guerrillas say they need at least 18 months to set up party structures and organize national
constituencies before the elections. The peace process has followed a rough road of setbacks and
advances. A combination of rebel military offensives and diplomatic initiatives, along with the
drumbeat of mounting international pressures on both sides to negotiate seriously, have thus far
pushed the process forward each time it has appeared to have stagnated. The June issue of UCA's
monthly journal Estudios Centroamericanos noted: "The negotiations process is being determined
directly by four forces, two of which are seated at the negotiations table (the government and the
FMLN). However, the government is restricted in its freedom to negotiate by the third force the
military and political extreme right. Finally, the fourth force is acting as if it enjoyed political and
ethical superiority, and with the comfort of knowing it holds ultimate military power the United
States." The article went on to point out that only the US has the power to bring the extreme
right in line, yet US officials have so far sent "confusing signals" and taken contradictory actions.
"Confusing signals" from Washington reflect a juncture in US policy. Throughout the 1980s policy
was predicated on the military defeat of the insurgency and consolidation of a reformist center. That
policy proved untenable, yet it would seem that US policymakers have yet to reach consensus on
an alternative. Some in Washington have argued for designing new strategies aimed at defeating
the armed and unarmed left and stabilizing the dominant bloc in El Salvador. Others call for a
negotiated solution which would acknowledge the existence and legitimacy of the left and accept its
coexistence within a new articulation of Salvadoran political forces. Last year Congress and the Bush
administration conditioned continued military aid to the Salvadoran regime on serious negotiations
by the government, sending a persuasive message to the military. Yet the administration reversed
this step early in 1991 after a series of FMLN actions, a move which bolstered the morale of the
armed forces, and led to a hardening of its positions in the peace talks. This and other "contradictory
signals" are seen as calculated by US policymakers to maximize the Salvadoran regime's advantage
at the bargaining table, rather than to undermine the negotiations process itself, which the US
clearly supports. However, such questionable tactics could well backfire by strengthening extreme
right intransigence. In sum, El Salvador is living a moment of critical transition, and the outcome
is uncertain. A political settlement to the civil war in El Salvador would represent a milestone in
Latin America, and set a potent precedent for resolving the civil war in neighboring Guatemala.
Negotiated peace in El Salvador would make a major contribution towards achieving stability
and economic recovery of war-torn Central America. The alternative to a negotiated settlement is
accelerated decomposition and polarization of Salvadoran society, and with it, a new cycle of war
and the specter of further instability throughout Central America.
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